











































Citation for published version:
Ridge, M 2015, Internalism: Cui bono? in G Bjornsson (ed.), Motivational Internalism. Oxford University
Press, USA. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.001.0001
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.001.0001
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:




(c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Internalism
Page 1 of 14
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of


























Page 2 of 14
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of












































Page 3 of 14
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of












































Page 4 of 14
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of











































Page 5 of 14
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of












































Page 6 of 14
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of









































Page 7 of 14
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of








































Page 8 of 14
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of










































Page 9 of 14
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of












































Page 10 of 14
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of











































Page 11 of 14
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of











































Page 12 of 14
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of











































Page 13 of 14
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of

































Page 14 of 14
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of
Edinburgh; date: 18 August 2015
(6)	See,	e.g.,	Tresan	(2006).
(7)	Cf.	Bedke	(2009)	and	Björnsson	(2002)	for	some	discussion	of	how	this	might	go.	My
own	view	is	actually	more	complex	on	this	front.	I	think	that	the	internalist	thesis	I	put
forward	in	the	text	(Goldilocks	Internalism)	actually	can	be	defended	on	a	priori	grounds.
However,	although	I	lack	the	space	to	discuss	this	here,	I	think	that	Goldilocks
Intenralism	can	then	be	used	as	a	premise	in	an	argument	for	another	form	of	internalism
that	can	itself	be	established	partly	on	empirical	grounds.	This	other	form	of	internalism
drops	the	“or	you	are	irrational	clause”	but	weakens	the	connection	to	motivation	to	a
mere	capacity	to	be	motivated	accordingly.	Some	of	the	additional	empirical	facts	needed
to	establish	this	stronger	form	of	internalism	are	empirical	facts	about	the	ubiquity	of
deep	normative	disagreement.	One	useful	framework	here	is	that	both	a	priori
constraints	and	empirical	facts	can	help	us	determine	the	best	theory	of	the	states	that
play	the	role	of	normative	judgments	for	us,	so	that	both	a	priori	and	empirical	facts	can
be	relevant	to	determine	what	realizes	that	role.	I	discuss	these	nuances	more	in	Ridge
(2014).
(8)	Note	that	this	formulation	includes	both	a	wide	scope	and	a	narrow	scope	necessity
operator.	This	reflects	the	fact	that	I	think	de	re	internalism	should	itself	be	understood
as	a	necessary	truth,	if	it	is	true	at	all.	This	marks	a	contrast	with	the	formulation	drawn
from	Tresan	above,	but	one	which	preserves	the	de	re	reading.	The	thesis	would	be	de
dicto	only	if	there	were	no	narrow	scope	necessity	operator	since	that	is	what	ensures
that	the	relevant	judgment	is	necessarily	accompanied	by	motivation	(given	practical
rationality,	on	my	formulation).
(9)	Thanks	to	Caj	Strandberg	for	drawing	me	out	on	this	point.
(10)	Cf.	Mark	Schroeder’s	exchange	with	Daniel	Boisvert,	where	Schroeder	argues	that
insofar	as	this	is	true	it	makes	the	fancy	hybrid	machinery	somewhat	otiose	and
unmotivated	(Schroeder	2009).
(11)	I	try	my	hand	at	it	in	chapter	3	of	Ridge	(2014).
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